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Abstract 
As the Department of Defense (DoD) moves from the single-system, platform-
centric paradigm to the capabilities-based paradigm, the scope and complexity of 
solutions are growing.  The increasing emphasis on joint service and system-of-
systems (SoS) capabilities has created both opportunities and challenges for 
materiel acquisition.  A key barrier that needs to be overcome for the DoD to achieve 
the promises of joint service and SoS programs involves the challenge of 
“transaction costs.”  These are the less visible, but nonetheless significant, costs of 
negotiating, managing and monitoring transactions.  In an effort to identify the effect 
of transaction costs on more complex acquisition programs, this paper examines  
cost and schedule breaches in a subset of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAP) that includes a sample of 84 programs, divided into “joint service” and 
“traditional” (single service) acquisition programs, and “single system” and “system-
of-systems” (SoS) programs. The results suggest there is a statistically significant 
higher risk of cost and schedule breaches in SoS programs than in single system 
acquisition programs.  This paper contributes to a broader study that eventually 
needs to be conducted that will evaluate the benefits and costs of increased reliance 
on joint service and SoS programs. 
Keywords: Transaction Costs, Acquisition, Joint Service, System-of-
Systems, Cost Breaches, Schedule Breaches, Cost Estimating 
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1. Introduction 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is in the process of radical 
transformation—transformation to a national security strategy predicated on joint 
service purchases and complex system-of-systems (SoS) capabilities.1  The DoD’s 
increasing emphasis on joint service and SoS capabilities has created both 
opportunities and challenges for materiel acquisition. In terms of improving the 
effectiveness of warfighting capabilities, the opportunity exists for joint, 
interoperable, multi-function, multi-mission systems that leverage information 
dominance and improve decisions and outcomes by making US and coalition forces 
not only better informed but also more coordinated, faster and more adaptive. In 
terms of efficiencies, multiple opportunities exist for joint programs to cut “economic 
production costs”—by reducing duplication, by exploiting learning curves, and by 
achieving economies of scale and scope in manufacturing and in operations and 
support activities (e.g., joint training and logistics).  
As we move from the single-system, platform-centric paradigm to the 
capabilities-based paradigm, the scope and complexity of solutions are growing.  As 
we move beyond our experience base (and our empirical data sets) we must ask 
some profound questions: 
 As the magnitude and complexity of DoD systems increase, how do we 
develop realistic cost, schedule, & performance baselines? 
 Are we measuring the right drivers of cost/schedule? 
 Are linear assumptions and models valid? 
                                            
1 As defined in the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004), an SoS is “a set or arrangement of 
systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities.” Joint Program Management is defined as “Any defense acquisition 
system […] or technology program that involves formal management or funding by more than one 
DoD Component during any phase of a system’s life cycle” (DAU, 2004, p.1). DoD Directive 5000.1, 
The Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 2003, indicates a policy preference for joint 
development programs over Component-unique development programs (AT&L). 
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The answers to these questions lie at the heart of our ability to provide 
reliable estimates on projected outcomes for major defense investments to senior 
defense decision-makers as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The New Systems Acquisition Context 
A key barrier needs to be overcome for the DoD to achieve the promises of 
joint service SoS programs. This involves the challenge of “transaction (coordination 
and motivation) costs.” These are the less visible, but nonetheless significant, costs 
of negotiating, managing and monitoring transactions.   
This paper investigates cost and schedule breaches in a subset of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) that includes a sample of 84 programs, 
divided into “joint service” and “traditional” (single service) acquisition programs, and 
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is a statistically significant higher risk of cost and schedule breaches in SoS 
programs than in “single system” acquisition programs.  This paper contributes to a 
broader study that eventually needs to be conducted that will evaluate the benefits 
and costs of increased reliance on joint service and SoS programs. 
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2. Joint Service and System-of-Systems Programs 
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
replaced the “Requirements Generation System” that had identified warfighter needs 
for nearly 30 years (recently updated in CJCS, 2007, May 1). Providing a new, 
substantive role for Combatant Commanders, the JCIDS process reflects a 
significant shift in the focus of defense programming toward joint system capabilities.  
Greater emphasis on joint operations in the DoD has led to the requirement 
for interoperability not only between new systems and legacy systems but also 
between systems developed by different agencies or services.  This requires 
cooperative management of development and acquisition programs.  Crossing 
management domains creates or intensifies issues related to decentralized 
management and independent authority of service agencies and can result in 
asymmetrical incentives for SoS versus “single system” and/or “single service” 
weapon systems. 
In several recent cases, the size and complexity of undertaking SoS 
programs has overwhelmed the DoD’s ability to effectively manage them. According 
to a recent Congressional Research Service report, “management and oversight of 
acquisition programs increases as the value of the program increases” (Chadwick, 
2007, p. 12). The larger the program, “the more difficult it is to sustain 
communications among staff members. In general, if there are ‘n’ people in a 
program, the potential number of pair-wise channels is n(n-1)/2 […L]arger teams […] 
have a greater chance of communications breakdown” (DAU, 2004, p. 16). Ceteris 
paribus—the bigger the program, the larger the transaction (coordination) costs. 
There are a variety of categories of joint service programs. These range from 
relatively simple, ”single system”, “single service” programs to which other services 
sign on to use the end product, to fully integrated, multi-service SoS programs. 
Examples of the latter include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Clearly, the latter (joint service 
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SoS) acquisitions are considerably more challenging than the former. The reason 
can be traced to greater interdependence, manifested in greater complexity and 
uncertainty.  
Most weapon system programs are interdependent in one way or another.  
They often exchange resources and information, which imposes additional costs and 
constraints on the efficient execution of the program.  The effects of 
interdependence and complexity can be largely hidden however, since the majority 
of weapon systems are still managed in a single service environment.  In essence, 
the DoD defines capabilities at the joint level but manages the majority of 
acquisitions at the service level.  As a result, the costs of interdependence and 
complexity are not routinely captured or included in cost and budget estimates.     
Joint service SoS acquisitions involve more stakeholders, multiple users and 
funding sources, divergent and competing requirements, and conflicting objectives 
that lead to difficult and contentious trade-offs, diffused authority, negotiated budget 
arrangements, complex project management structures, etc. This increased 
interdependence is generally reflected in greater transaction costs: higher 
“coordination costs” from increased complexity and uncertainty, and higher 
“motivation costs” from greater asset specificity and limited market contestability.  
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3. Transaction Costs = Motivation Costs + 
Coordination Costs 
In business, two costs are typically factored into strategic acquisition 
decisions: production costs and the costs of managing the transaction—or 
“transaction costs” (Coase, 1937). Conventional strategies tend to focus on 
economic production costs (input costs, learning curves, economies of scale and 
scope, etc.). TCE emphasizes another set of costs—coordination and motivation 
costs. Economic production (opportunity) cost advantages tend to guide companies 
to specialize in “core” activities in which they have a comparative advantage and to 
“transact” with outside suppliers to acquire other goods and services. A key 
contribution of TCE is to formally introduce and fully reveal the nontrivial costs of 
managing those transactions.  
Transaction costs include coordination and motivation costs, such as search 
and information costs; decision, contracting and incentive costs; and measurement, 
monitoring and enforcement costs. TCE predicts these costs will vary across 
weapon system acquisition programs to the extent there are differences in certain 
key characteristics of the transaction—complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset 
specificity—as well as market contestability, and the choice of governance 
(contracting, etc.) mechanisms. A central point from TCE is that the choice of 
contract, organization, and incentives, along with key characteristics of the 
transaction (complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity) and market 
contestability, must be considered in order to obtain reliable cost estimates of joint 
programs (Melese, Franck, Angelis & Dillard, 2007). 
One of the key insights of TCE is that capital (and human capital investments) 
that are specific to a transaction (e.g., made to support a joint program acquisition) 
can generate cost savings but also carry the risk of increasing transaction costs from 
opportunistic behavior. The role of relation-specific investments (“asset specificity”) 
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is an important consideration that needs to be anticipated and factored into any 
analysis of “joint service” and SoS programs. 2  
 
                                            
2 Williamson (1996) identifies six types of asset specificity: 1) site, 2) physical asset, 3) human asset, 
4) dedicated asset, 5) brand-name capital, and 6) temporal. These are specialized investments that 
generate high returns within a specific relationship but offer little value outside it. Site specificity refers 
to the co-location of facilities to minimize inventory or production costs. Physical asset specificity 
refers to the use of customized assets such as specialized dies and equipment. Human asset 
specificity refers to firm-specific knowledge and skills (e.g., “specific” as opposed to “general” 
training). Dedicated asset specificity refers to additional investments in plant and equipment made to 
sell the extra output to a specific customer. Brand-name capital specificity refers to investments in 
reputation. Temporal asset specificity refers to investments that facilitate timing and coordination of 
projects (e.g., investments in critical-path activities). 
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4. Motivation Costs: The Role of Asset Specificity 
Having made a specialized investment in location, physical, human, or other 
specific assets, a supplier often becomes the most efficient provider, which is good 
from a production-cost perspective, but provides incentives for the supplier to look 
for opportunities to extract more from the transaction (perhaps by demanding steep 
prices for any modifications to the contract). After investments in specific assets are 
made, the relationship is transformed from a customer having the choice of a 
number of competing suppliers to a bilateral monopolistic relationship between a 
buyer and seller.  
Similar to “sunk costs,” investments in relationship-specific assets (“asset 
specificity”) are potentially valuable but can increase risks to both parties in a 
transaction (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). Close-in bilateral bargaining (a 
principal-agent type game) replaces the competitive marketplace. This entails a 
transformation of the supplier from competitive bidder (prior to source selection) to 
monopoly supplier (after source selection), especially if there are no close 
substitutes. Accordingly, the customer (government) is now vulnerable to 
“opportunistic behavior” from the supplier.  
Unforeseen contingencies, combined with newly inelastic demand, may 
prompt the supplier to extract more of the surplus created in the relationship.3 In this 
case, suppliers can exploit their power in the relationship by renegotiating a basic 
agreement to their advantage, otherwise threatening to dissolve the agreement. The 
TCE literature refers to this as a “hold-up”4 (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian 1978).  
                                            
3 Williamson (1975), Besanko, Dranove, Shanley & Schaefer (2000), and others have labeled the 
transition from one prospective buyer and many sellers to one buyer and one seller or from 
competitive market to bilateral monopoly, as the “fundamental transformation.”  To some extent, this 
transformation occurs after the completion of every military source-selection process. 
4 According to Besanko et al. (2000), a holdup problem arises when a party in a contractual 
arrangement exploits the other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets. 
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Conversely, a supplier (defense contractor) that makes specific investments 
in assets that are only valuable in the context of the relationship with a specific 
customer (government), can find itself vulnerable to any changes in demand from 
that customer (i.e., the supplier suffers from “demand uncertainty”). Given the 
government is the only buyer (or one of only a few) of joint SoS weapon systems, 
and given its limited ability to commit as a result of the annual nature of most 
budgetary processes, defense industry sellers often face a monopsony—a buyer 
that cannot make credible multi-year commitments. This leads to sellers facing 
substantial demand uncertainty and the real risk of strategic renegotiation.  
Whereas relation-specific investments can increase the total gains to both 
parties, the risk exists of opportunistic behavior; either party can hold up the other, 
for instance, by threatening to change the terms of the contract (e.g., the 
government’s sovereign right to terminate a contract for convenience as well as 
default). The danger is that if neither party feels it can recover the full costs of its 
investment in the relationship/transaction (say through a continuation or renewal of 
the contract—“frequency”),5 then efficiency-generating, specific investments will not 
be made, resulting in higher costs.6  
It is important to note at this point that whereas TCE has traditionally 
examined the customer-supplier relationship in the context of a contractual 
arrangement, the domain of joint capabilities acquisition is distinctive (though not 
                                            
5 In terms of “frequency,” past experience with similar programs appears to have a significant impact 
on a supplier’s costs and capabilities. So, if source selection and strategic partnership decisions 
recognize this and clearly favor past performance, the acquisition process will be converted from a 
one-shot game into a repeated game, allowing suppliers to earn a return on their investment in 
reputation. In this way, increasing frequency through strategic partnerships and recurrent transactions 
can mitigate opportunistic behavior and build trust in the contracting relationship. By identifying key 
characteristics of transactions such as frequency and fully understanding their implications, decision-
makers could mitigate cost, schedule and performance breaches.  
6 Scope for opportunistic behavior may lead to adverse selection, choice of an (ex-ante) inferior 
option (or technology), or moral hazard.  Such scope increases risks that if a relationship-specific 
investment is made, the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For 
example, changes in specifications are frequently used by contractors as a reason to raise prices and 
profits under government contracts—especially when those investments by the contractor create 
barriers to the entry of competitors. 
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exclusively so) in the establishment of partnerships among government entities 
(such as between DoD services or agencies), as well as teaming arrangements 
among private-sector enterprises within the defense industrial base (e.g., product 
development contractors and their first- and second-tier suppliers). These internal 
relationships also incur transaction costs related to coordination and motivation 
costs; search and information costs; decision, contracting and incentive costs, etc. 
This notion is explored further below. 
Whereas defense acquisition has traditionally focused on economic 
production costs, joint programs expose the DoD to the potentially greater costs of 
managing the relationship, and more importantly, to the risks of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of contracting partners—a critical “transaction cost.” Given the 
multiple competing stakeholders in a joint SoS acquisition, the principle of self-
interest suggests all sides have incentives to behave opportunistically and may not 
necessarily have the motivation to cooperate to make cost-saving investments—
particularly when specific assets are involved and information is imperfect 
(incomplete or uncertain) and asymmetric.7 Clarification of the risks of “opportunism” 
(i.e., motivation costs) is one of the key advantages of TCE.  
If it turns out that joint service SoS programs require a significantly greater 
ratio of specific assets to total investments, then this increases the risk of bilateral 
dependency and “hold-up.” Moreover, given the difficulty of writing complete 
contracts for joint SoS programs that will cover every contingency, with incomplete 
contracts the hold-up problem poses additional risks for the government, such as 
contractors charging excessively high prices for change orders and strategic 
renegotiations.  
                                            
7 In order to combat this tendency, and in the spirit of resolving the principal-agent problem, an 
interesting incentive clause is included by the US Air Force in its “National Polar-Orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System.” When establishing top executives’ salaries and bonuses, the 
contract requires TRW’s corporate board to consider contract performance. By tying senior executive 
pay directly to contract performance, decision-makers can help align incentives, increase 
accountability and reduce cost overruns (Graham, 2003). 
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5. Governance Issues 
TCE suggests the degree of completeness of a contract is an optimizing 
decision by the parties involved, one that reflects tradeoffs between ex-ante 
investments in contract design and the risk of ex-post costs of opportunistic 
renegotiation. In reality, contracting offers an imperfect solution to opportunism. 
What may be required are additional governance mechanisms (i.e., rules and 
regulations, reputation mechanisms, termination agreements, government-furnished 
equipment, Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities, warranties, 
etc.) to shift risks to safeguard and protect transaction-specific investments, settle 
disputes, and adapt to new conditions. Ex-ante efforts may also be necessary to 
screen for reliability and reputation (e.g., pre-award contract surveys of potential 
venders). These structures can include anything from agreements to share and 
verify cost and performance information through incentive contracts, to the careful 
crafting of dispute-settlement mechanisms (e.g., alternate dispute resolution, 
proactive management councils, etc.). Among government entities in joint acquisition 
programs, memoranda of understanding or agreement (MOUs or MOAs)8 reflect a 
“quasi contractual” relationship among ostensibly sovereign entities. The 
enforceability of these is always questionable, but they nevertheless serve to make 
the particulars of agreements among the parties explicit and provide both implicit 
and explicit dispute-resolution mechanisms to reduce the risk of hold-up. 
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, and the lower the 
requirement for specific assets, the easier it is to write an explicit contract that 
covers all contingencies. Also, the lower the administrative and enforcement costs of 
that contract, the lower the risk of hold-up. These favorable characteristics are more 
                                            
8 The Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program featured elaborate memoranda of agreement 
among domestic and international partners to reduce the risk of hold-up.  Despite these structures, 
the sovereignty of partner governments limited the enforceability of these instruments, and hold-ups 
did occur—notably when the legislatures of the partner governments imposed changes to the 
agreements articulated in the MOAs, upon which program plans were based.  The consequential 
impact of program cost, schedule, and performance outcomes have not been fully characterized but 
would be a worthwhile subject of future TCE research. 
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likely to exist in established, traditional (“single service”), “single system” acquisition 
programs, and contribute to lower costs (or cost overruns), and better performance 
and schedules. 9 
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) in construction contracts 
reveals that in cases in which a transaction is easy to define and measure (i.e., there 
is little complexity) and only a few minor changes are expected (i.e., there is little 
uncertainty), fixed-price type contracts tend to dominate. However, the more 
complex the transaction—the more difficult/costly it is to define and measure 
performance; the more uncertain the transaction—the more likely it is that a change 
in the contract will be required and the more severe the adversarial relationships 
experienced ex-post when fixed-price contracts are chosen. In the latter case, fixed-
price type construction contracts often end in costly renegotiations—in which any 
surplus generated was dissipated in the course of those negotiations through 
unproductive bargaining and influence activities. Thus, complexity and uncertainty 
can force parties to turn away from fixed-price type contracts and towards cost-
reimbursement type contracts (e.g., costs plus a award/incentive fee) and to rely 
heavily on reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex-post 
opportunistic behavior that threatens to dissipate the gains generated by a 
transaction. 
                                            
9 If a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold-up problem), and involves a 
product or service that is: a) well-defined and homogeneous, b) easy to measure (limited complexity 
and mild information asymmetry), c) routinely used (recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to 
change (limited demand uncertainty), and e) is offered by competing suppliers, then there is little 
room for negotiation (price and performance are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of 
unproductive bargaining is near zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine and 
uncomplicated transactions, substantial production and transaction cost stability can be expected in 
the acquisition. Moreover, since administrative, incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for 
acquisitions in more contestable (competitive) markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the 
transaction is relatively smaller for the military, and there exists an incentive for the supplier to invest 
in the transaction that generates opportunities for cost savings. International competition for standard 
(off-the-shelf) commercial components of weapon systems might be an example. By unbundling 
large, complex weapons systems into sub-systems, decision-makers might reveal opportunities to 
enjoy the benefits of lower transaction costs and greater competition, leading to lower production 
costs. These favorable characteristics generally lend themselves to more accurate cost estimating 
and may result in fewer cost breaches. 
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In reality, joint service acquisition programs often involve highly 
interdependent, complex system-of-systems (SoS) that usually end in a bilateral 
monopoly contractual setting.10 In this case, assuming no specific assets are 
required, the outcome depends on the degree of contractual ambiguity governing the 
transaction, as well as on any administrative and enforcement costs involved. 
However, as complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism due to specific investments 
increase, so does the risk of hold-up and so do the coordination and motivation 
(transaction) costs required to measure, monitor, and govern both the internal 
relationships among the Components and the external relationship with the 
contractor. These less-favorable characteristics of joint SoS programs can 
discourage productive efforts and investments in both internal Component 
relationships and external contractor relationships, thus contributing to more serious 
cost overruns, schedule breaches, and performance shortfalls. 
 
                                            
10 Many factors conspire to create this bi-lateral monopoly. On the buyer side, monopsony power 
partly derives from the fact the military value of most systems depends solely on their performance 
relative to the systems of adversaries. This is specific to a country and the defense environment it 
faces at a particular point in time, effectively making it the sole buyer of a highly differentiated 
product. The appearance of a superior alternative results in what might be termed military 
obsolescence. Response to new threats can require redesign during development, and modifications 
during the system’s operational life. This cause-and-effect relationship conspires to reduce the 
number of buyers of a particular weapon system, since these weapon systems are often evolving 
products (spiral acquisition). Thus, in addition to technical uncertainty, there is a significant degree of 
demand uncertainty.  
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6. Coordination Costs: Interdependency yields 
Complexity and Uncertainty  
Interdependency is typically defined as the degree to which the performance 
of one activity (or system) relies on an external activity (or system) for its success 
(Thompson, 1967). Under conditions in which organizations are allowed to seek the 
most efficient path to task accomplishment, interdependent relationships will be 
established as long as the benefits exceed the costs. Private entities typically make 
technology investments and seek interdependencies to achieve the benefits of 
synergy and economies of scale based on measurable effects on the “bottom line.” 
In contrast, government agencies are often guided and constrained by legislative 
requirements for cross-organizational integration to establish interdependent 
relationships. Consider, for example, the increased emphasis on “jointness” since 
the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The 
intent of this legislation was clearly to increase interoperability, and hence 
interdependency, in the DoD. Combined with recent reforms that reinforce joint 
solutions to defense capability needs (such as JCIDS), simultaneously encouraging 
SoS, the result is increased interdependency reflected in increased complexity and 
uncertainty, and correspondingly higher coordination costs.11 
For most systems, interoperability is pursued as a means to leverage the 
collective assets of various organizations located at different points along the value 
chain. For example, in the command and control (C2) process, military operations 
                                            
11 Interdependent activities are not new to the DoD or to government in general.  However, what is 
new is the scale in which interdependent actions are applied. Prior to the information technology 
revolution of the 1990s, spatial and temporal distances tended to impede communication and the 
sharing of information among partners.  Hence, tightly coupled activities were generally restricted to 
small groups of geographically co-located groups where coordination costs could be minimized. The 
advent of advanced information and communication technologies eroded many of the spatial and 
temporal barriers that once thwarted collaboration. The potential benefits of information-sharing 
enabled by interoperability were then quickly realized and became a major thrust for many 
organizations, the DoD included. Network externalities were increasingly recognized—the value of 
the network to individual participants increased with the number of participants connected to the 
network.  
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benefit when commanders can seek, synthesize, and disseminate several types of 
information derived from different organizations. Experts in a variety of areas must 
collaborate during the C2 process to effectively create and execute battle plans. 
These experts may come from different disciplines (or specialties), different 
branches of the military, or even different countries. In short, interoperable systems 
promote interdependent actions. In turn, increased interdependency is reflected in 
increased complexity and uncertainty and higher coordination costs. 
Complexity is a key component of transaction costs. When advanced 
(immature) technologies are combined with systems integration challenges across 
diverse organizations in the scale of joint service SoS programs, the resulting 
complexity leads to higher coordination costs. Marshall and Meckling (1962) were 
among the first to discover that variability in the size of cost-estimating errors in 
defense contracts could at least partly be attributed to technological complexity, with 
larger errors associated with greater technological advances sought in different 
systems.12 
Uncertainty is another key component of transaction costs. The reconciliation 
of competing requirements of different players in joint programs can lead to design 
changes and implementation challenges (demand uncertainty). Similarly, the “free 
rider problem” (in which none of the players want to sacrifice individual budgets to 
cover costs that might benefit others), combined with changes in Congressional 
priorities (political uncertainty), can lead to funding instability (budget uncertainty). 
Besides demand, political, and budget uncertainty, joint programs face 
                                            
12 Adler (1995) examines the complex and interdependent relationship between product design and 
manufacturing, describing four possible governance mechanisms to improve coordination (e.g., 
standards, schedules, mutual adaptation and teams). McNaugher (1989) provides evidence that 
costs rise rapidly with system complexity, as does the variance of costs around expected costs (p. 
128). Consider the increase in complexity in the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class, 
which has experienced a 128% cost growth and which was designed to avoid costs through smaller 
crews (substituting capital for labor). It is unclear whether the substantial increase in transaction costs 
and scope for opportunism introduced with the increased complexity (capital investment in complex 
onboard systems) justifies the anticipated labor-cost savings. 
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measurement uncertainty, technological uncertainty, supplier performance 
uncertainty, etc.13 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate if increased 
emphasis on “jointness” since the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 or the advent of the JCIDS in 2003 has increased the 
complexity and uncertainty of joint programs relative to others and, consequently, 
raised coordination and motivation costs. The possibility exists that other 
characteristics inherent in many joint programs might offset these higher transaction 
costs.  
On the one hand, a joint program manager that manages a program that is 
technologically mature, that does not require strict military specifications, in which 
funding and requirements are relatively stable, and in which a contestable market 
exists for the product or service, may in fact experience lower transaction costs. On 
the other hand, if the program is facing immature technologies, rigid specifications, 
funding and requirements instability, and monopolistic suppliers, joint program 
managers and other key decision-makers should recognize the potential for high 
transaction costs and opportunistic behavior.  
 
                                            
13 A dynamic programming model by Womer & Terasawa (1989) finds that under demand 
uncertainty, a rational defense contractor must prepare for various contingencies, and will, for 
example, restrict investments in specific assets, which drives costs higher than they would be if 
demand were certain. This tends to increase information and contracting costs, and as the authors 
demonstrate, threatens investments in specific assets. The authors show that the higher the 
probability the contract will be canceled, the less the contractor will invest in capital equipment 
(relation-specific investments), which results in relatively more labor-intensive production and raises 
costs. Thus, demand uncertainty increases contracting costs and also raises issues related to asset 
specificity. Under demand uncertainty, the rational contractor will restrict investments in specific 
assets (such as capital tooling or specialized expertise), unless they are reasonably sure to recover 
these costs via overhead.  Allowing “Facilities Capital Cost of Money” to be an expense is a 
mechanism by which the government reduces the risk to the contractor by allowing recovery of costs 
associated with specific capital assets (buildings, tooling, etc.) through overhead.  Critics argue this 
encourages defense contractors to over-capitalize, which increases costs DoD-wide. 
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7. TCE and Cost Estimating 
The higher the transaction costs, the greater the economic production cost 
efficiencies need to offset them. As recently emphasized by Melese et al. (2007), if 
initial cost estimates focus exclusively on economic production costs and ignore 
transaction costs, the result can be systematic cost overruns.  
According to a recent RAND study of major acquisition programs, the average 
cost overruns of weapon systems in the development phase ranged from 16% to 
26%. Procurement cost growth over initial estimates averaged between 16% and 
65%, while total weapon program cost overruns averaged from 20% to 54% (Arena, 
Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006).  
Since the official “acquisition program baseline” (APB) estimates for these 
programs reflect the best current understanding of the cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives at the time the baseline is established (typically at Milestone 
B decisions), Congressional funding of these programs represents an implicit 
contract with the Executive Branch. When incomplete or unrealistic cost estimates 
lead to significant cost and schedule overruns relative to expectations established in 
the APB, administrative sanctions, such as statutory (Nunn-McCurdy14) unit cost 
                                            
14 Since the law was enacted in 1982, Title 10 USC Section 2433, a “Nunn-McCurdy” unit cost breach 
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of at least 15% in 
program acquisition unit cost or average procurement unit cost above the unit costs in the acquisition 
program baseline. Through 2006, the DoD had the ability to administratively change the acquisition 
program baseline for the purposes of unit cost reporting and so was able to reduce the number of 
apparent Nunn-McCurdy breaches, despite apparent cost growth that would otherwise trigger the 
Nunn-McCurdy sanctions.   In 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy law was amended.  The FY 2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) severely restricted the DoD’s ability to change unit cost reporting 
criteria.  As a result, Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches are incurred at 15% (“Significant”), and 25% 
(“Critical”) above the current unit cost threshold.  Additionally, a “Significant” Nunn-McCurdy breach is 
incurred at 30% of the Milestone B unit cost threshold, and a “Critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach is 
declared at 50% growth above the Milestone B unit cost threshold.  Thus, the ability of the DoD to 
mask unit cost growth through changes to unit cost thresholds is restricted.   
The sanctions imposed by Congress on programs breaching Nunn-McCurdy criteria are noteworthy:  
For “Significant” breaches, the service Secretary must notify Congress within 45 days of the report 
(normally program deviation report) upon which the determination is based (normally a program 
deviation report initiated when the Program Manager becomes aware of the breach).  The program 
must submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the required unit cost breach information. 
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breaches, can be triggered. In turn, these breaches can dramatically impact program 
execution; they also jeopardize relations between the Legislative and Executive 
Branches of government.   
A study conducted by the DoD in 2007 to develop a business case for 
improving system cost estimating in the DoD (Brown, Flowe, & Hamel, 2007a) 
examined the cost growth of all major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) from 
1995 to 2005 to determine the source and relative magnitude of cost growth and 
schedule breaches. See Figure 2.  
                                                                                                                                       
For “Critical” breaches, the Defense Secretary (usually delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) must certify to Congress within 60 days of notification that: 
1) the program is essential to national security,  
2) there is no alternative which can provide equal capability at less cost,  
3) the updated estimates of unit cost (calculated independently by the OSD Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group) are reasonable, and 
4) the management structure is adequate to control unit cost going forward.    
Failure to certify within the 60-day timeframe will result in suspension of obligations for major 
contracts until 30 days of continuous session of Congress, beginning from the date of receipt of 
SAR/Certification. 
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Changes in program cost estimates are reported annually by programs 
via SAR (Selected Acquisition Report), and are assigned to stardard
categories to indicate reason for change.    
Values displayed here are the sum of all cost changes for all
MDAPs over the evaluation period (1995-2005).  All values reported in 
millions of Base Year 2005 dollars unless otherwise noted.
Source SAR Data 1995-2005 All MDAPs
 
Figure 2.  Cost Growth by Category for All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe, & Hamel, 2007a) 
As shown in Figure 2, the largest source of cost growth as reported in the 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) is “Estimation.” This indicates that estimates 
made in establishing MDAP acquisition program baselines were often in error, and 
thus program costs appeared to grow despite very little change in the objective 
content of the program. This “Estimation” error accounted for approximately $201 
billion in apparent cost growth over the 10-year period examined across all major 
programs.   
Figure 3 is a related analysis that examines the quantity and sources of 
breaches for 108 MDAPs over the same 10-year period (1995–2005). With respect 
to the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), schedule breaches were the most 
common; occurring 244 times over the 10-year period examined, suggesting that 
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Figure 3.  Breaches Reported by SAR All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe, & Hamel, 2007a) 
Development and procurement cost breaches occur with less frequency than schedule 
breaches but still occur sufficiently frequently that on average, each MDAP can expect to have 
one of each. Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breaches occur nearly as frequently as 
schedule breaches, indicating that the confluence of development and procurement cost 
increases conspire to increase unit costs at least 10% above that established by the APB. 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches are notably less common, suggesting that only about 20% of 
programs that breach their APB unit costs will grow substantially beyond that. Overall, the 
raw quantity of breaches indicate that expectations regarding costs and schedules are usually 
unmet, to the extent that for the 108 MDAPs examined, each breached on average more than 
twice for schedule and unit cost and at least once for development cost.15  
                                            
15 This is not to imply that every program was equally troubled. A subset of particularly troubled 
programs, approximately 30% of the total, breached in some way every year they reported. 
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8. Cost and Schedule Breaches 
We investigated cost and schedule breaches in a subset of MDAPs that 
included a sample of 84 programs, divided into “joint service” and “traditional” (single 
service) acquisition programs, and “single system” and “system-of-systems” (SoS) 
programs. The 84 DoD weapon system programs were initially examined by Brown, 
Flowe, and Hamel (2007b) and were identified as being either “single system” or 
“system-of-systems.”  The “system-of-systems” designator was used as a proxy for 
complexity.   
While it seems reasonable to assume that programs designated as “system-
of-systems” will be more complex, it is not necessarily true that such programs will 
be joint programs involving more than one service.  For example, an aircraft carrier 
is certainly a “system-of-systems” but is managed by a single service, the Navy.  
Another example would be the F-22, arguably a “system-of-systems” and certainly 
complex, but still only managed by a single service, in this case the Air Force.  On 
the other hand, there may be “single systems” that are considered joint programs 
because they are either managed or procured by more than one service. 
SoS programs are defined as independent systems that are integrated into a 
larger system to provide unique capabilities.  The identification of a program as SoS 
can be seen as a proxy for complexity.  Joint programs are systems that involve 
more than one service during any phase of the program (i.e., development, 
production, operations) and can be seen as proxy for coordination costs. Using this 
distinction between “system-of-systems” and “joint,” we assigned a “joint service” 
designator to the 84 DoD weapon systems originally used by Brown, Flowe, and 
Hamel (2007b).  Table 1 shows the programs divided into “single service” and “joint 
service” categories.  
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Single Service (n = 58) Joint Service (n = 26) 
PATRIOT PAC-3 H-1 UPGRADES (4BW/4BN) 
CVN 68 NAVSTAR GPS 
EELV AMRAAM 
TRIDENT II MISSILE MH-60R 
ARH F-35 (JSF) 
DDG 51 V-22 
DDG 1000 (DD(X)) ATIRCM/CMWS 
C-17A GBS 
SBIRS HIGH NPOESS 
C-130J AEHF 
CVN 21 MH-60S 
T-45TS JTRS JOINT WAVEFORM 
SSDS MP RTIP 
MINUTEMAN III PRP WGS 
ADS (AN/WQR-3) BLACK HAWK UPGRADE (UH-60M)
GLOBAL HAWK (RQ-4A/B) JTRS GMR (CLUSTER 1) 
GMLRS BMDS 
F-22A AGM-88E AARGM 
E-2C REPRODUCTION JTRS HMS (CLUSTER 5) 
CH-47F JDAM 
JAVELIN PATRIOT/MEADS CAP 
LAND WARRIOR MIDS 
TACTICAL TOMAHAWK JASSM 
FBCB2 JPATS 
WIN -T AIM-9X 
C-130 AMP JSOW 
STRYKER  
FCS  
MINUTEMAN III GRP  
C-5 RERP  
AESA  
LHA REPLACEMENT  
SSGN  
MUOS  
SDB I  
E-2D AHE  
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VH-71 (VXX)  
MPS  
EFV  
SSN 774 (VIRGINIA CLASS)  
NAS  




BRADLEY UPGRADE  
MCS  
FMTV  
LONGBOW APACHE  
Table 1.  Single Service and Joint Service Programs 
a. Methodology 
A set of 84 DoD weapon system programs first divided into “single service” 
and “joint service” programs by Brown, Flowe, and Hamel (2007b) were further 
divided into either “single system” or “system-of-systems” (SoS) programs. (Data 
available upon request.)  Our tests focused on four categories of breaches: 
Schedule, RDT&E, Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), and Average 
Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) defined as follows:  
 Schedule Breach:  When schedule exceeds most recent Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB) schedule estimate by 6 months 
 RDT&E Breach:  When the program’s research, development, test 
and evaluation costs exceed 15% of the baseline threshold. 
 PAUC Breach:  When the program acquisition unit cost exceeds the 
most recent APB threshold by 15%.  This is a Congressionally 
reportable breach. 
 APUC Breach:  When the average procurement unit cost exceeds the 
most recent APB threshold by 15%.  This is a Congressionally 
reportable breach. 
Our hypothesis is that SoS programs are more complex than single system 
programs, so they will be more likely to experience cost and schedule breaches.  
Likewise, Joint programs require more coordination than traditional (single service) 
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programs and are also more likely to experience cost and schedule breaches.  
Schedule and cost breaches may be evidence of hidden transaction costs. 
To investigate the differences between the data groupings described above, 
we ran an analysis of variance using “jointness” as the grouping variable instead of 
“system-of-systems.”  Because the subdivided samples were not normally 
distributed, we also ran a Kruskal-Wallis (H) test to determine if there was a 
significant difference in the mean ranks of the groups, testing single service vs. joint 
service and single systems vs. system-of-systems (SoS). The H test is particularly 
robust as it does not make any assumptions about the underlying distribution of the 
samples.  We also considered whether there might be a difference in average 
number of breaches between development and production programs.  We used a 
Mann-Whitney (U) test (which does not make any assumptions about the underlying 
distribution of the samples) to test our hypothesis.  We looked at the difference in 
mean ranks for schedule breaches, cost breaches (including RDT&E, procurement, 
PAUC and APUC) and total breaches. 
b. Results 
Table 2 compares the results of the tests based on the two different 
groupings.  While it is clear, as noted by Brown, Flowe, and Hamel (2007b) that 
there is a significant difference (at the .05 level) in the average number of schedule 
breaches and RDT&E cost breaches between “single system” and “system-of-
systems” programs, there is no significant difference between “single service” and 
“joint service” for any of the breach categories examined. 
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 Single Service  
Joint 













breaches 4.49 8.60 0.0229 5.71 8.88 0.1058 
RDT&E 
breaches 1.64 5.87 0.0010 3.48 4.85 0.3404 
PAUC 
breaches 2.36 4.24 0.0693 3.17 3.81 0.5739 
APUC 
breaches 1.10 1.82 0.1678 1.48 1.50 0.9757 
Table 2.  Analysis of Variance 
This data suggests that while the “system-of-systems” designator may be a 
good proxy for complexity, which in turn may lead to schedule and cost breaches, 
“jointness” does not appear to make a difference when it comes to program 
breaches.  This is an unexpected result, since we reasoned that joint programs are 
more likely to experience higher transaction costs and therefore might experience 
more cost breaches if their cost estimation models do not include variables to 
account for those transaction costs.  The data seems to suggest that complexity may 
be the overriding influence on schedule and cost breaches regardless of whether a 
program is managed by a single service or multiple (joint) services. 
The results of the H test are reported in Table 3.  Again we see that 
complexity (as measured by “system-of-systems”) has a significant influence on the 
mean ranks for schedule and RDT&E breaches.  We also see that there is a 
significant difference between mean ranks for schedule breaches between “single 
service” and “joint service” programs but not for cost breaches.  As Brown, Flowe, 
and Hamel (2007b) noted, joint programs have more participants, divergent 
requirements, diffuse authority and complex management structures all of which 
might contribute to schedule breaches.  It appears, however, that those conditions 
do not necessarily lead to cost breaches.  Again, we may conclude that complexity is 
more important to cost breaches than “jointness.” 
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Variable Single System System of Systems 











Schedule breaches 34.36 49.56 0.0039 38.56 51.31 0.0246 
RDT&E breaches 32.44 51.22 0.0002 39.34 49.56 0.0631 
PAUC breaches 39.14 45.41 0.2244 41.70 44.29 0.6418 
APUC breaches 39.60 45.01 0.2633 42.09 43.42 0.7977 
Table 3.  Kruskal-Wallis (H) Test 
Overall, the results are consistent but somewhat weaker considering the 
difference in the average number of breaches between development and production 
programs using the U test as shown in Table 4.  The results show a significant 
difference between the mean rank of schedule, cost and total breaches in 
development programs based on complexity (as measured by “system-of-systems”).  
In each case, the mean rank is higher for “system-of-systems” programs than for 
“single system” programs.  We also see a significant difference in mean ranks of 
cost and total breaches in production programs based on complexity.  Again, the 
mean ranks are higher for “system-of-systems” programs than for “single system” 
programs.  But there is no significant difference in mean ranks of either development 
or production program breaches between “single service” and “joint service.”  This 
reinforces our earlier observations that complexity (as measured by “system-of-









 Development Production Development Production 




0.1558 0.0624 0.2126 
Cost breaches 0.0414 0.0225 0.2603 0.5703 
Total 0.0276 0.0289 0.1632 0.4497 
Table 4.  Mann-Whitney (U) test 
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These findings should be interpreted with a note of caution. For example, the 
limited sample, the method for categorizing the degree of interdependence or 
“jointness” and SoS, and the failure to include and control for other important factors 
may be significant. Though preliminary, these results offer evidence to support 
further investigations on the role of “jointness” and SoS in program acquisition. 
c. Discussion 
The results suggest there is a statistically significant higher risk of cost and 
schedule breaches in SoS programs than in “single system” acquisition programs. 
Interestingly, while “joint service” programs in general have a weak statistically 
significant greater risk of schedule (and RDT&E cost) breaches than “traditional” 
(single service) programs, there is no significant difference between the two in terms 
of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breaches or Average Procurement Unit 
Cost (APUC) breaches.  
Based on our sample, SoS programs tend to take relatively longer and cost 
more than “single system” acquisitions. This preliminary empirical evidence of cost 
and schedule breaches suggests initial cost (schedule) estimates of SoS programs 
may not be adequately capturing transaction costs. In fact, since production cost 
breaches are significantly greater, the transaction costs experienced by SoS 
programs may be overwhelming any potential economic production cost savings 
(Melese et al., 2007). If this is indeed the case, the anticipated warfighting benefits of 
SoS solutions need to be sufficiently large to compensate for the extra costs and 
schedule delays experienced by these programs.  
Meanwhile, it appears that while “jointness” contributes to schedule overruns, 
it only weakly contributes to development cost overruns, and by itself, does not 
explain production cost overruns. While our results suggest joint programs tend to 
breach their schedules relatively more often than “single service” programs (“every 
event in a joint program takes longer […] extra time needs to be included in the 
program schedule” (DAU, 2004, p. 20)), “joint service” programs in our sample only 
experienced a few more cost breaches than “single service” programs in the early 
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development (RDT&E) stages. There does not appear to be any statistical difference 
in production cost breaches (PAUC or APUC) between “joint service” and “single 
service” programs. 
One explanation for this is that the “joint service” programs in the sample 
encompass a spectrum that includes both “single systems” and SoS, as well as the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with SoS is so significant as to overwhelm 
any additional complexity and uncertainty that might be experienced by joint service 
programs. Another possibility is that built-in checks and balances tend to offset the 
extra transaction costs of joint service programs. 
For instance, “joint programs require special attention to multi-service funding 
requirements and to acquiring the right mix of joint expertise for the source selection 
process”; indeed, “full consultation and coordination with the participating 
components” is required (DAU, 2004, pp. 12, 21). The ultimate outcome may be to 
help anticipate and mitigate the extra transaction costs and to avoid requirements 
creep in production stages of the program. Guidance for joint program managers is 
designed to inhibit any changes in scope, stating that “substantive changes to […] 
program documentation, such as the acquisition strategy or the contract [need to be] 
negotiated with the participating Components prior to making changes” (p. 12). 
With weapon system investments expected to capture a significant, and 
perhaps growing, share of defense budgets, unprecedented attention has been 
devoted to clarifying the determinants of risk, failure, and success in the joint arena 
(Pracchia, 2004). The Defense Department’s apparent inability to avert or even 
predict adverse program outcomes such as cost and schedule breaches is not only 
a source of external criticism (GAO, 2006) and internal attention (Krieg, 2005), it has 
undermined confidence in the time-honored practices of program management and 
oversight.  
To date, there is significant debate regarding the factors that influence the 
outcomes of programs. Thus, the search for root causes and potential solutions of 
program cost growth, schedule delay, and capability shortfall have received 
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increased attention. To help explain potential pitfalls associated with joint programs, 
this study leverages “Transaction Cost Economics” (TCE), which has recently been 
applied to generate new insights into defense cost overruns (Melese et al., 2007). 
9. Conclusion 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests investigating the specific 
characteristics of transactions that make up joint service programs (like SoS) could 
help anticipate (and perhaps mitigate) cost and schedule breaches. Since increases 
in interoperability/interdependence tend to increase complexity and uncertainty, and 
complexity and uncertainty increase coordination and motivation costs, it is likely 
that cost and schedule breaches partly depend on decisions regarding the extent of 
bundling or unbundling of the many interdependent parts of joint systems,16 and on 
the particular phase of development or production of those weapon systems.  
Historically, fixed-price contracts are usually prescribed in later stages of 
product development when complexity and uncertainty have been resolved, and the 
contract is complete. In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts are usually 
prescribed in earlier stages of product development when complexity and 
uncertainty have not been resolved, and the contract is incomplete.17 Today, cost-
                                            
16 For instance, an extremely complex interoperable system is envisioned for the Coast Guard’s new 
“integrated deepwater system program.” The system is intended to include cutters and small boats, a 
new fleet of fixed-wing aircraft, a combination of new and upgraded helicopters, and land- and cutter-
based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—all linked with Command, Control, Communications and 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and supported by 
integrated logistics. According to a recent Coast Guard press release (2007, June 25), “Deepwater is 
a 25-year, $24 billion effort that will produce more than 91 new cutters; 195 new aircraft” and C4ISR 
equipment. The lead systems integrator is a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop 
Grumman that has recently been in the news for major cost overruns, schedule slippages, and quality 
issues—the latter involving several modified ships that were determined un-seaworthy.  
17“Complexity” and “technological uncertainty” (as opposed to “demand uncertainty”) are usually 
correlated. Ignorance about what buyers want and what contractors can do result in large up-front 
search and information or Research and Development (R&D) costs. R&D is similar to a real option in 
the sense that real options models are learning models(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). The problem that 
gives rise to high transaction costs in the case of complex weapon systems is that this characteristic 
of the transaction leads to market failure (missing markets). From a TCE perspective, the classic 
market failures—natural monopoly, negative externalities, public goods, etc.—have information 
analogues: missing markets, adverse selection, and moral hazard. 
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reimbursement contracts are phased out and fixed-price contracts phased in, as 
complexity and uncertainty issues are resolved. However, complexity and 
uncertainty must be characterized in the context of TCE for this strategy to succeed. 
Note that while these prescribed contracts focus on the characteristics of complexity 
and uncertainty, often overlooked is the vital role of asset specificity—a key 
component reflected in the motivation cost component of transaction costs. 
The main strategy of reducing cost and schedule breaches is employed to 
identify ways to cut coordination and motivation costs. Specific recommendations 
include: a) reducing complexity by investing in a more complete contract (e.g., 
setting realistic baselines—entailing higher search and information costs—or using 
more mature technologies, recently emergent in acquisition policies; b) reducing 
uncertainty through multi-year contracts (reducing demand uncertainty) or investing 
in a more complete contract (reducing relationship uncertainty); c) increasing 
measurement (CAIG) and monitoring (GAO) of performance and both production 
and transaction costs to reduce information asymmetries and the associated risks of 
moral hazard and adverse selection; d) placing credible deterrents to bad behavior 
in place—such as penalty clauses, warranties and bonding; e) using multi-year 
contracts to gather information and to reward good reputations (Kelman, 1990); f) 
mitigating opportunistic behavior introduced by asset specificity through careful use 
of incentives, proper bundling (or task-partitioning) of joint programs, and strategic 
investments in government-furnished equipment or government-owned and 
contractor-operated assets; and finally g) increasing market contestability through 
investments in real options (e.g., government-controlled standby capacity—credible 
threat of vertical integration; or second sourcing—credible threat of entry).18  
                                            
18 Since full-scale competition can involve duplicating high fixed costs and can require significant 
investments in specific assets, reliance on multiple sources is often prohibitively costly. Instead, 
duplicative supply has often been a way to hedge against technical uncertainty. For example, in the 
crash effort to develop ICBMs, two fully duplicative, concurrent programs were used to cut lead 
times—the Atlas and Titan projects. In more limited attempts to secure competition, parallel efforts 
can be applied in early stages of acquisitions (such as in systems development), with production then 
being allocated to a single source (“fly before you buy”). In practice, however, the greater the degree 
of asset specificity and fixed costs required in these design competitions, the less effective they are; 
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We believe any evaluation of joint service—and particularly SoS—acquisition 
programs would benefit from an analysis of the characteristics of the corresponding 
bundles of transactions through the lens of TCE. An inspired effort to collect and 
analyze data guided by TCE (as described in this paper) could help DoD decision-
makers anticipate and mitigate cost and schedule breaches and avoid future 
performance shortfalls. 
   
                                                                                                                                       
indeed, knowledge is not easily transferred and close integration is needed between design and 
production. As witnessed in the Air Force’s F-22 program, GAO (2006) reports 200% cost overruns; 
the bulk of costs in most programs occur in the post-design stages. The threat of second sourcing 
(turning to another supplier) may be one way to inject discipline into the supply process. But if this 
threat is perceived by the seller to increase the risk of opportunistic behavior by the government 
buyer, then this added risk will raise the initial bids. Assuming effective competition existed for the 
initial contract, program managers cannot gain overall efficiency by using such tactics (Anton & Yao, 
1987). Another possibility is inter-generational competition or to inject some competition between a 
new system and its predecessor. The extension of existing systems provides some insurance against 
delays in the availability of the next-generation systems. 
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